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EDITORIAL COMMENTS
AFRICAN IMPERALISM
Some international cases are hard. The facts are controverted, the norms
uncertain, hence determining the lawfulness of unilateral actions is difficult.
In the Western Sahara . case, facts and law are clear and condemnation of
unlawful action must not be evaded.
For years, the Kingdom of Morocco neither claimed nor indicated any
aspirations for the Spanish Sahara. Indeed, from 1966, Morocco joined
in resolutions for Saharan independence.2  But phosphate deposits and the
potential strategic value of the Sahara apparently caused revisions of the
Moroccan position. The announcement by Spain in 1974 that it would con-
duct a referendum under UN auspices and supervision in 1975 moved Mo-
rocco to seek to have the International Court adjudicate an issue essentially
within the competence of the Saharan people;3 neighboring Mauritania's
appetite was whetted, and it too joined the scramble. The Court, to its
credit, affirmed the primacy of the principle of self-determination in the
case.4  The shabby diplomacy of threats and secret deals which followed
the decision discredits all who participated in it. Despite a series of resolu-
tions by the UN General Assembly and the opinion of the International
Court, the Kingdom of Morocco, in flagrant violations of law, has entered
Western Sahara, annexed part of the territory into Metropolitan Morocco,
the other part going to its accomplice, Mauritania, and conducted a mock
referendum. 5
The implications of this case for minimum order in Africa and for the
continued vitality of the principle of self-determination in general are
grave. Decolonization is a mockery if a non-self-governing territory passes
from the hands of one alien Metropolitan to another, with the transaction
conducted by secret agreement of elites and not by the free expression
of the people. Self-determination is frustrated if the transfer of territory
does not include a plebiscite or some other form of popular consultation.
The effectiveness of the International Court and of the General Assembly
in matters of human rights and non-self-governing territories is undercut, if
authoritative decisions of fact and policy are rudely ignored. It is sad to
1 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1965] ICJ REP. 12. Full text also in 14 ILM
1355 (1975); excerpted 70 AJIL 366 (1976). For a further account of the case,
see T. Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, supra p. 694.
2 For a concise review of the political history of the dispute, see the separate opinion
of Judge De Castro, Western Sahara [1975] ICJ RBP. 127 et seq.
3 Originally King Hassan invited Spain to join in contentious jurisdiction. When
he was rebuffed, Morocco pressed the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion.
See G.A. Res. 3292, 29 GAOR, Supp. 31, at 103-4, UN Doc. A/9681 (1974).
& [1975] ICJ REPa. 31-33.
5 For details, see Le Monde, Feb. 27, 1976, at 4, cols. 1-3; id. Feb. 28, 1976, at 2,
cols. 2-4; id. Feb. 29, 1976, at 1, col 1; Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1976, at A.10, col 5.
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note that two "Third World" and "new" states here openly violate prin-
ciples to which the Third World, in substantial part, owes its existence.
In the most immediate sense, Moroccan and Mauritanian behavior in the
Western Sahara case threatens to ignite flammable irredentist situations
existing throughout Africa. Political borders on the continent do not cor-
respond to the distribution of tribal, ethnic, and linguistic communities.
Virtually every African state has, in the language of the General Assembly
and the International Court, "legal ties" of some sort with people and
events in neighboring countries. Any doctrine that authorizes the con-
solidation of inchoate "legal ties" into territorial sovereignty will prove, at
the least, mischievous and at the most, calamitous for regional order.
The actions in Western Sahara thus violate not only the rights of the in-
habitants of the territory, but also the hopes for minimum order for all
Africans.
The reluctance of the Organization of African Unity to take a forthright
position on the case is understandable, but it is wrong. The perniciousness
of this case will go far beyond the sands of the Sahara.
W. MicnAE RFismsm
FOREIGN POLICY AND FiDELiry TO LAW: THE ANATOMY
OF A TREATY VIOLATION
On April 13 President Ford signed a bill unilaterally to extend the
fisheries jurisdiction of the United States from the present 12-mile limit to
200 miles onto the high seas (and even thousands of miles at sea with
regard to salmon) effective March 1, 1977.1 Barring a sudden break-
through in the law of the sea negotiations, as of March 1, 1977 the Coast
Guard may begin arresting vessels on the high seas pursuant to this act in
violation of the treaty obligations of the United States. This action again
exposes the inadequacy of the present foreign policy process for taking an
international legal perspective into account.2 It may also prove the greatest
mistake in the history of U.S. oceans policy.
During the past decade fishing pressure on stocks off the U.S. coasts has
increased dramatically, largely as a result of an increase in foreign fleets
using newer technologies. The result has been that some stocks such as
haddock were largely fished out and many others were severely depleted.
These problems off our coast mirror a worldwide crisis in fishery manage-
ment with existing international law not providing jurisdiction coextensive
with the range of the stocks. The resulting "common pool problem"
actually created a disincentive to conserve similar to early experiences with
depletion of oil reserves in the East Texas oil fields. Thus the culprit itself
was to a significant extent an outmoded legal structure. The plethora of
'See the "Statement of the President Upon Signing the 200-Mile Fishing Legisla-
tion," April 13, 1976. 12 WEEKLY ComPmATioN OF PREsmENTmAL Docmmu NTs 644
(1976), full text in Contemporary Practice section, infra p. 820.2 See, e.g., Moore, Law and National Security, 51 For. Arr. 408 (1973); Falk, Law,
Lawyers, and the Conduct of American Foreign Relations, 78 YALE LJ. 919 (1969).
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fisheries bilaterals and limited multilaterals that sprang up to plug the
disintegration of this legal structure only moderately stemmed the flow.
By the early 1970's these defects in fisheries jurisdiction were well under-
stood. The remedy was to seek a new law of the sea which would recog-
nize fisheries jurisdiction coextensive with the range of the principal types
of species. That is, an extension of coastal limits for coastal species (200
miles includes about 95% of coastal species), host state control over
anadromous species (such as salmon) throughout their range on the high
seas, and a network of regional international agreements for highly migra-
tory species (such as tuna). By the end of the 1975 Geneva session of
the Law of the Sea Conference it seemed likely that such a structure would
be adopted as part of a comprehensive treaty, though the details of the 200-
mile economic zone and provisions for highly migratory species were yet
to be agreed.s
Prior to the Geneva session of the Conference the Senate had over-
whelmingly passed a bill unilaterally to extend U.S. fishing jurisdiction from
the present 12-mile fishery contiguous zone to 200 miles. In doing so it
was understood by the Senate that it was too late for House action that ses-
sion.4 Passage was widely regarded as a signal to Executive branch policy-
makers that unless something was done quickly to ease the foreign fishing
pressure Congress would act.
Executive branch interim fisheries policy had focussed on negotiating
yearly bilateral agreements (with the Soviets, Japanese, Koreans, and
others) and limited multilateral agreements (within the International Com-
mission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, the International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission, and other commissions) to alleviate the pressure
until a comprehensive law of the sea treaty could be concluded. A separate
fisheries office in the Department of State did little else but negotiate these
agreements. This policy, though moderately successful, particularly after
the serious push developed for passage of the 200-mile bill, was too little
and too late. The Office of the Law of the Sea of the Department of State
estimated during late 1975 that as a result of recent breakthroughs in fishery
agreements only nine stocks out of more than 100 off our coasts were
below maximum sustainable yield and continuing to decline as a result of
foreign fishing.5 By then, however, some major commercial stocks such
as haddock had a zero quota and the 200-mile bill had a full head of steam.
Sadly, there were other approaches which in combination with the fishery
negotiations could have dramatically improved protection for coastal fish
stocks without violating the legal obligations of the United States or
severely impairing overall U.S. oceans interests. Under Article 2 of the
3 See the "Informal Single Negotiating Text," Arts. 50-62, 53 and 54. UN Doe.
A/CONF.62/WP.8, 14 ILM 682 (1974). See also the "Revised Informal Single
Negotiating Text," Arts. 50-52, 53, 54, and 55 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.
1/Part U (May 6, 1976).
4 This early Senate vote was 68 in favor, 27 opposing, and 5 not voting. See 20
CoNG. Rzo. S.21130 (daily ed. Dee. 11, 1974).
5 See the testimony of John Norton Moore in Hearings on S.961 Before the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Nov. 19, 1975.
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1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 0 the coastal state ex-
ercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of explor-
ing and exploiting its natural resources including living organisms belong-
ing to sedentary species. Many of the most seriously destructive foreign
fisheries use bottom tending trawls which harvest large quantities of crab
and other sedentary species along with targeted finfish stocks. After officers
from the State Department Law of the Sea Office observed piles of crab
and other shelf creatures on the decks of Soviet and Japanese vessels during
a Coast Guard flight over the Bering Sea, the Office began pushing for
regulation of bottom tending trawls when such use would normally result
in a catch of sedentary species clearly under U.S. jurisdiction. Because of
the heavy dependence on bottom tending trawls, such regulation, if imag-
inatively pursued, could have led to dramatic side gains in protection of
finfish stocks. Though we were successful in getting new regulations ap-
proved, they were drastically watered down by an overly cautious bureauc-
racy and never produced the potential protection.7 The first opportunity
for a creative legal approach to the problem was, if not lost, at least
misplaced.
There was yet a second opportunity. Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas8 contemplates unilateral coastal state conservation measures for
protection of threatened coastal stocks provided certain specified criteria,
such as nondiscrimination against foreign fishermen, a prior six-month effort
to find a negotiated solution, and submission of disputed actions to impartial
arbitration, are met. The United States is party to this Convention, al-
though neither the Soviet Union nor Japan, among other nations fishing
off our coast, are parties. Nevertheless, prevailing legal opinion is that
the Article 7 right reflects customary international law and that the
United States could lawfully apply these measures against nonparties. In
addition, exploratory overtures with the Soviets, Japanese, and British
indicated a relaxed attitude toward an Article 7 approach as opposed to
the 200-mile bill. Building on this provision and the evident need for an
alternative to the 200-mile bill, in late 1974 a Working Group of the Na-
tional Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea
prepared a bill based on this "Article 7" approach. Once again the Law
of the Sea Office recommended adoption by the Administration of an alter-
native approach to the 200-mile bill, urging that the fish stocks could be
protected faster through such an approach and that without such an ap-
proach the 200-mile bill would be highly likely to pass. Unfortunately,
this approach was blocked at a high level within the State Department for
over a year until it was too late to do any good. Ironically the Article 7
approach was picked up in the Senate by Senators Griffin and Cranston
6 15 UST 471, TIAS No. 5578, 499 UNTS 311, 52 AJIL 858 (1958).
7These new regulations were explained in a letter of September 5, 1974 from John
Norton Moore to the Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Senator Warren
G. Magnuson.
8 17 UST 138, TIAS No. 5969, 559 UNTS 285, 52 AJIL 851 (1958).
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and received 37 votes as an alternative to the 200-mile bill even though the
Senators had only a week to sell it with no Administration support! 9 To
the State Department's credit, shortly before the final Senate action the
Department did recommend the Article 7 approach to the President, to be
coupled with a veto of the 200-mile bill. This late recommendation was at
least reluctantly acquiesced in by the other concerned Departments.
On the eve of the vote, however, the President refused to take any action
even informally indicating Administration support for the Griffin-Cranston
amendment. This inaction ensured passage of the 200-mile bill.
During the congressional battle on the 200-mile bill the Law of the Sea
Office systematically pointed out to all Senators and Congressmen that the
200-mile bill would violate the treaty obligations of the United States and
would be seriously harmful to overall national oceans interests.10  Specif-
ically, it was pointed out that absent new fishery agreements in place be-
fore March 1, 1977 (which at this writing in July, 1976 we do not have):
-the bill would violate Articles 1, 7, and 9-12 of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas;
-under prevailing international law as recognized by the United States
the bill would violate Articles 2, 6, and 22 of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas;
-the bill would violate a number of fishery bilateral and limited
multilateral agreements though most of these are relatively short-
term;
-the bill would undercut the cardinal tenet of United States oceans
policy: no illegal unilateral oceans claims. As the largest user of the
world's oceans the United States has the most to lose by a pattern of
unrestrained national extensions. If we can make such claims over
others' oceans interests others can make their own claims over ours.
This is not merely an imaginary horrible. In only three months fol-
lowing passage of the 200-mile bill, Canada, France, Guatemala,
Japan, Spain, India, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Senegal, and other nations
have announced or have begun planning new unilateral oceans
claims. The claim by Senegal to a 150-mile territorial sea, among
other claims, has been specifically justified by reference to the United
States action;
-the bill would undermine the law of the sea negotiations in a variety
of subtle ways (including giving away a major bargaining lever),
even though its endorsement of the popular 200-mile limit is unlikely
to and has not resulted in collapse of the negotiations;
9 See the floor debate on the Cranston-Griffin Article 7 amendment to S.961. 122
CONG. REc. S.701-10 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1976).
10This was done through personal letters and memoranda to all Senators and
Congressmen, systematic coverage of staff, and individual appointments with each
Senator who would grant an appointment (over balf the Senate) and many Congress-
men, a high level phone campaign by the executive branch where it was felt to be
useful as well as, of course, the usual executive branch-congressional relations efforts.
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-the bill would undermine the important effort to obtain agreement
on a regional international arrangement for the conservation and
management of tuna. Following passage of the bill these negotia-
tions with our Latin American neighbors, which had been the most
promising in the over 20-year history of the tuna dispute, collapsed;
-the bill could lead to a risky confrontation with the Soviet Union,
Japan, or other nations fishing off our coasts when we begin arresting
their vessels on the high seas. The Soviet Union and Japan have
protested the action even though they are prepared to accept a 200-
mile economic zone as part of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty.
Recently, they also held joint talks in Moscow on "common fishery
problems";
-even short of a confrontation, in view of the heavy dependence of
the Japanese on fish stocks as a source of protein, the bill could
significantly harm United States-Japanese relations. Again, this has
proven not to be merely an imaginary horrible. In Japan the bill
has been referred to as a "stab in the back" by the United States.
Prime Minister Mild recently protested passage of the bill directly to
President Ford; and
-the bill would undermine U.S. efforts to obtain binding international
conservation standards and other reasonable restraints on coastal
nations in the exercise of expanded jurisdiction within the 200-mile
economic zone.
With some exceptions, notably the vigorous and enlightened opposition of
Senators Griffin (Michigan) and Gravel (Alaska) and Congressmen Mc-
Closkey (California) and Fraser (Minnesota), there was little congressional
interest in whether the bill violated international law. Indeed there was
little interest in any of the points in opposition. Though many felt other-
wise, my assessment was that the legal argument coupled with arguments as
to present protection of stocks through recent breakthroughs in fisheries
agreements probably had been the most effective in opposition."' Never-
theless, the treaty violation was received with a large yawn.
Unfortunately, violation of our treaty obligations had equally little im-
pact on the Secretary of State or the President. Though Secretary Kissinger
signed a few letters to congressional leaders early in the battle, he resisted
all efforts to weigh in hard, most seriously in refusing to testify before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in opposition despite repeated en-
treaties from the Law of the Sea Office that his testimony could be de-
cisive.' 2 Similarly, despite an earlier decision to oppose, President Ford
11 One counterargument heard in the House debate as to the illegality of the bill was
that it did not violate the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation since
the Soviets and Japanese were not parties to that Convention No one pointed out in
rebuttal that the United States was a party and would be likely to be arresting sig-
natories that were fishing off the U.S. coast.
12At one point the Law of the Sea Office succeeded in writing a paragraph in
opposition to the 200-mile bill into Secretary Kissinger's testimony on another subject
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This arrangement was worked out
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signed the bill even against the advice of the State and Justice representa-
tives that it would put the United States in violation of international lawl
A presidential veto, at least if coupled with an Article 7 approach, could
have been sustained, as is evidenced by the over 100 votes in the House in
opposition (with no effective White House opposition) and the 37 votes
in the Senate for an Article 7 approach (with no Administration support).
The President, however, had made statements during election year political
appearances in New England strongly suggesting that he would sign the
200-mile bill if passed by the Congress.' 3
Fidelity to law in foreign policy must not remain the frail reed which
this sad example illustrates. There is little reason to believe that fidelity
to law has fared much better on a variety of other politicized issues, for
example the Byrd Amendment with respect to the Rhodesian chrome con-
troversy. There is no sure cure other than a fundamental change in at-
titude. But there are steps which, I believe, can modestly alleviate the
problem. These are:
First, we should add an international legal specialist to the White House
staff and give him access to the President. Surely in a structure which
has a Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs there is room
for an international legal adviser! This could be accomplished by adding
to the White House staff a Special Assistant to the President for Inter-
national Legal Affairs or another Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs who would be understood to be an international
legal specialist. Though both the Office of Legal Counsel of the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Legal Adviser's Office of the Department of State
with the pre-agreement of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. An
hour before the testimony was to be delivered Kissinger personally removed the para-
graph. In fact, I had started for the Hill and received a radio message from the
Secretary that the paragraph had been taken out and I need not be present for his
testimony.
Both Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush and Secretary Kissinger are on record
as to the illegality of the 200-mile fishing bill. Even President Ford in his signing
statement of April 13, 1976 admitted that "absent affirmative action, the subject bill
could raise serious impediments for the United States in meeting its obligations under
existing treaty and agreement obligations." He went on to say "the bill contemplates
unilateral enforcement of a prohibition on foreign fishing for native anadromous
species, such as salmon, seaward of the 200-mile zone. Enforcement of such a pro-
vision, absent bilateral or multilateral agreement, would be contrary to the sound
precepts of international jurisprudence," and "the enforcement provisions of H.R.200
dealing with the seizure of unauthorized fishing vessels, lack adequate assurance of
reciprocity in keeping with the tenets of international law." Statement of the President,
note 1 supra.
Is See, e.g., the transcript of the January 22, 1976 interview with President Ford by
newsmen in New Hampshire. Reports of White House capitulation on the 200-mile bill
circulated widely as early as the fall of 1975. On October 31, 1975 the San Diego
Union reported that "the Ford Administration has agreed to support extension of the
US fishing zone to 200 miles from its present 12-mile limit, Representative Robert
Leggett said here yesterday." More specifically the Union quoted Representative Leg-
gett, who chaired the House Subcommittee pushing the 200-mile bill, as saying "I got
a committment from the White House that if some of their terms can be satisfied
there will be no veto." See the San Diego Union, Oct. 31, 1975.
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seek to reflect international legal concerns, and often do so effectively, a
White House base with access to the President is essential."4 This may be
the single most important institutional change necessary to promote greater
fidelity to law in foreign policy.
Second, international legal considerations must receive greater attention
in Congress. In a body of 535 chiefs this is difficult to structure. Pos-
sibilities worth a try, however, include adding international legal specialists
to the staffs of both the Senate and House foreign relations committees and
charging them with promoting fidelity to law, and amending the Senate
and House rules to permit any ten Senators or Congressmen to require
preparation of an "International Legal Impact Statement" before a Senate
or House vote would be permitted on a suspect bill. The Congressional
Research Service or perhaps the new staff international legal experts could
oversee preparation of these impact statements.
Third, international lawyers and bar associations must more effectively
police adherence to law. For example, perhaps the American Bar As-
sociation Section of International Law or the American Branch of the Inter-
national Law Association should establish special subcommittees for the
purpose of promoting fidelity to law. Such committees might regularly
request meetings with the Secretary of State concerning current problems
of adherence to law in foreign policy.
Fidelity to law in foreign policy is as important as fidelity to law at home.
Our nation must adhere to its treaty obligations and lead the world toward
cooperative solutions to global problems. International lawyers have long
recognized these truths. The time has come to join hands to bring about
the needed institutional changes that can at least begin the process of
policing adherence to law.
JOHN MORTON MOORE *
THE FRAc-cs D xSK PRzE
Each year, the Board of Editors of the American Journal of International
Law awards a prize in memory of the late Francis De6dk for an especially
meritorious article appearing in the Journal. The Prize for 1976 has been
conferred on Mr. Giinther Handi for his article 'Territorial Sovereignty and
the Problem of Transnational Pollution," appearing in the January 1975
issue at page 50.
The Board of Editors extends its congratulations to Mr. Handl and ex-
presses its appreciation to Mr. Philip Cohen, the President of Oceana
Publications, Inc., through whose generosity an award is made to the
recipient of the Prize.
A.P.S.
14 The Legal Adviser, Monroe Leigh, and the Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel, Antonin Scalia, were vigorous in seeldng White House recogni-
tion of the importance of adherence to international law.
* Formerly Chairman of the National Security Task Force on the Law of the Sea and
Deputy Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference.
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